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Abstract
Most studies of Asian state involvement in Arctic affairs assume that shorter sea-lanes to Europe 
are a major driver of interest, so this article begins by examining the prominence of shipping con-
cerns in Arctic policy statements made by major Asian states. Using a bottom-up approach, we 
consider the advantages of Arctic sea routes over the Suez and Panama alternatives in light of the 
political, bureaucratic and economic conditions surrounding shipping and shipbuilding in China, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea. Especially Japanese and Korean policy documents indicate 
soberness rather than optimism concerning Arctic sea routes, noting the remaining limitations and 
the need for in-depth feasibility studies. That policymakers show greater caution than analysts, 
links in with our second finding: in Japan and Korea, maritime-sector bureaucracies responsible 
for industries with Arctic experience have been closely involved in policy development, more so 
than in China. Thirdly, we find a clear tendency towards rising industry-level caution and restraint 
in all three countries, reflecting financial difficulties in several major companies as well as growing 
sensitivity to the economic and political risks associated with the Arctic routes. Finally, our exam-
ination of bilateral and multilateral Chinese, Japanese and Korean diplomatic activity concerning 
Arctic shipping exhibits a lower profile than indicated by earlier studies.
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Introduction
How important are shipping and shipbuilding for the Arctic aspirations of leading 
Asian states? How much of their engagement is purely commercial, and how much 
is a reflection of political goals? We take a bottom-up approach, examining Arctic sea 
routes from the perspectives of Asian governmental agencies, companies and indus-
try associations, rather than a top–down approach centered on Arctic change. A 
recent study ranked China highest among the leading maritime nations of the world, 
with Japan and the Republic of Korea as third and fourth.1 Given the global orien-
tation of their maritime industries, these nations will always assess Arctic options 
across a wide array of alternatives. 
Since 2013, China, Japan and Korea have enjoyed formal observer status in the 
major international forum specifically targeting northern affairs, the Arctic Council.2 
All three countries emphasize the mutual benefits of cooperation with the Arctic 
states, but differ significantly in the salience they ascribe to various maritime business 
opportunities, in the centrality of their shipping ministries in Arctic policy develop-
ment, and in the preparedness of their maritime industries to commit themselves 
financially to northern sea routes. 
Three alternative transit routes are in focus in debates over trans-Arctic ship-
ping: the Northeast Passage between the Atlantic and the Pacific north of Russia, 
the Northwest Passage through Canada’s Arctic archipelago, and the Central Route 
across the North Pole. For the near future, it is only the Northeast Passage— 
specifically, the Northern Sea Route—that has attracted serious interest from Asian 
shipping actors.3 The Northwest Passage has depth limitations and remains severely 
constrained by permanent or moving ice. Regular use of the Central Route remains a 
futuristic scenario, requiring far greater ice retreat than seen so far.4 The “Northeast 
Passage” is the loose term historically applied to the entire Arctic passage between 
Europe and Asia: the Northern Sea Route is the clearly demarcated sea area between 
the Kara Sea in the west to the Bering Strait in the east, extending 200 nautical miles 
from the coast, developed and regulated by Soviet and Russian authorities since the 
1930s.5 In addition to its potential as a transit corridor, this route is of interest to 
the shipping industry because of transport-intensive resource extraction projects in 
the Russian North. Shipping out from the Arctic or into it is termed “destination 
shipping,” as distinct from transit shipping between the Pacific and the Atlantic.
Because most studies of Asian-state interest in the Arctic assume that shorter sea-
lanes to Europe are a major driver, we begin by examining the prominence of ship-
ping concerns in the Arctic policy statements of major Asian states.6 Contrary to 
the impression left by many analysts, these policy documents—those by Japan and 
Korea in particular—reveal soberness rather than optimism with respect to Arctic 
sea routes, highlighting the remaining limitations and the need for more in-depth 
feasibility studies. This greater caution from policymakers than from analysts can be 
explained by our second finding: in Korea and Japan, maritime-sector bureaucracies 
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responsible for industries with Arctic experience have been closely involved in policy 
development, more so than in China. Our third finding concerns the tendency to 
greater industry-level caution and restraint in all three countries, reflecting financial 
difficulties in several major companies as well as growing sensitivity to the economic 
and political risks associated with Arctic routes. On this basis, our final substan-
tive section examines bilateral and multilateral Chinese, Japanese and Korean dip-
lomatic activity in Arctic shipping, finding much lower profiles than indicated by 
earlier studies of Asian states in Arctic affairs. 
Shipping in Asian Arctic policies
Of the major Asian states, only India has not published a comprehensive policy doc-
ument with national priorities for the Arctic and how to pursue them. China issued 
its Arctic policy in January 2018, several years after Japan and Korea. As in all Arctic 
strategy documents so far, there is a fourfold emphasis on scientific research, eco-
nomic opportunities, environmental protection, and the human dimension—notably 
the traditions and living conditions of indigenous peoples. While such documents do 
not reveal all aspects of state interests, they provide occasions for articulating priori-
ties. Here we review these policy statements, noting their sensitivity to the privileged 
role enjoyed by Arctic coastal states and relatively little attention paid to maritime 
transport relative to scientific research and environmental protection. 
Arctic-policy Olympics
The flow of policy documents on the Arctic began shortly after the planting in 2007 
of the Russian flag on the North Pole seafloor by an expedition led by the Russian 
scientist, explorer and politician Artur Chilingarov.7 Previously, only Norway had 
issued a High North Strategy, defining this region as its “most important strategic 
priority area in the years ahead.”8 A few years later, all eight member states of the 
Arctic Council as well as one Permanent Participant had specified their Arctic pri-
orities and objectives—and by 2018 the same was true for six European and Asian 
observer states.9 
The European Union too has issued a series of Arctic statements, gradually dis-
tancing itself from the European Parliament’s controversial call in 2008 for a com-
prehensive international environmental treaty applicable to the Arctic Ocean.10 
That resolution coincided with similar suggestions by some environmental NGOs 
and scholars, that a firmer legal framework might be needed for adequate Arctic 
governance: however, the five coastal states with maritime zones adjacent to the 
Arctic Ocean—Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia and the USA—were 
negative to these ideas.11 The “Arctic Five” responded by issuing the 2008 Ilulissat 
Declaration, highlighting the law of the sea as a solid foundation for responsible 
management of the Arctic Ocean and stressing their “sovereignty, sovereign rights 
Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping: Policies, Interests and Footprints on Governance
27
and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean [which imply] … a stewardship 
role in protecting” Arctic ecosystems.12 
The Ilulissat Declaration and the accompanying diplomatic activity served to 
infuse greater caution in subsequent policy statements by the EU as well as other 
non-Arctic players.13 Such caution is also evident in the Arctic statements by the 
Asian states examined here. 
China 
Due to China’s steadily rising geopolitical status, its foreign-policy moves are followed 
with keenness by the outside world. China acquired its first (and as yet only) ice- 
breaking research vessel in 1993; in 2004, the Polar Research Institute of China 
set up an Arctic research base in Svalbard. This Norwegian archipelago is the most 
accessible among high-latitude research sites—for climatic reasons, and because 
the Spitsbergen Treaty ensures “equal liberty of access and entry for any reason 
or object whatever” for nationals of all signatories.14 China is an original signatory 
to the Spitsbergen Treaty; as with the other Asian states examined here, its Arctic 
engagements have expanded during the past decade from an early focus on scientific 
research, orchestrated by polar research agencies more heavily engaged in Antarctic 
than in Arctic research.
China’s Arctic policy document is thorough and specific, reflecting a longstand-
ing process of developing regional priorities and defining four principles: respect, 
cooperation, win–win results, and sustainability. “Respect” and “cooperation” refer 
primarily to international institutions, notably the UN Law of the Sea Convention 
(LOSC) and the network of “global, regional, multilateral and bilateral channels” 
for facilitating joint endeavors.15 Reciprocity is highlighted - that coastal states must 
respect the rights that non-Arctic states enjoy in the region—a point reiterated in 
official Chinese statements on the Arctic over the past decade. A speech by the Assis-
tant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hu Zhengyue, on a visit to Svalbard in 2009 was 
the first prominent articulation of how China perceives its role in this region. Only 
slightly modified, this speech titled “China’s view on Arctic cooperation” was pub-
lished on the Ministry website, indicating that it represented official policy.16 Like the 
2018 policy document, the 2009 speech reflects China’s longstanding foreign-policy 
line of reassuring the outside world that it accepts the international order.17 Three 
points emphasized by the Assistant Minister in 2009 are no less prominent in the 
2018 official policy document: the requirements under LOSC for cooperation with 
non-Arctic states on matters such as shipping, the gains derivable from joint scien-
tific research and peaceful pursuit of win–win opportunities, and the transregional 
effects of Arctic environmental change.18 
How one’s own country is affected by Arctic environmental change is a prominent 
and recurrent feature of all Asian-state policy statements on the Arctic, explicitly 
justifying a greater scientific presence in the region and implicitly suggesting some 
level of stakeholder saliency.19
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The third principle put forward in Chinese policy, “win–win results,” has become 
increasingly prominent in official statements and was in 2015 already cited among 
the central norms underlying China’s practice in the Arctic.20 The term, with variants 
like “common interest” or “mutual benefit,” occurs throughout China’s Arctic policy 
document. Also the final principle, “sustainability,” present in early statements, has 
become more elaborate and pronounced with time—in the policy document, refer-
ences to sustainability or environmental or ecological protection are outnumbered 
only by those to “China.” 
China’s Arctic policy devotes considerable attention to maritime transport, and 
makes some bold claims: “The utilization of sea routes and exploration and devel-
opment of the resources in the Arctic may have a huge impact on the energy strategy 
and economic development of China … [and] China’s capital, technology, market, 
knowledge and experience is expected to play a major role in expanding the net-
work of shipping routes it the Arctic and facilitating the economic and social prog-
ress of the coastal States along the routes.”21 Shipping is mentioned first among the 
economic sectors of interest to China—but references to the economy appear only 
after China’s policies and positions concerning scientific research and protection of 
the Arctic environment are elaborated.22 Highlights include the “constructive role” 
China has played in “the formulation of Arctic-related international rules,” presum-
ably including the negotiation of the legally binding Polar Code under the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, as well as the “Polar Silk Road” branch of the broader 
infrastructure project known as the Belt and Road Initiative (see below). 
The four principles articulated in China’s Arctic policy sit well with Bennett’s 
argument that China is systematically building two mutually reinforcing narratives to 
gain legitimacy as a regional stakeholder: one territorial, highlighting its “near-Arc-
tic” location and involvement in Arctic research, and one globalist, highlighting the 
extra-regional impacts of Arctic change.23 This balancing of territorial and globalist 
arguments for a role in Arctic affairs is also highly compatible with the general direc-
tion of policy spelt out in Japan’s and Korea’s Arctic documents. 
Japan and Korea
Arctic sea routes feature prominently but soberly in the Japanese and the Korean 
policy documents. The framing introductory sentence of Japan’s Arctic strategy 
mentions the first liquefied natural gas carrier to sail from Europe to Japan through 
the Northeast Passage in 2012. Examination of the feasibility of this route is one of 
three focus areas for the strategy, along with scientific research and international 
cooperation.24 Japan’s Arctic engagement began early, with accession to the Spits-
bergen Treaty in 1925. In 1973, Japan established its National Institute of Polar 
Research; in 1990, a research station on Svalbard was opened. Along with European 
polar-research heavyweights like Germany and the UK, Japan was accepted as a 
full member of the International Arctic Science Committee in 1991, shortly after 
that organization was formed; research cruises in the Arctic Ocean began in 1998. 
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Further, Japanese institutions, together with Russian and Norwegian partners, car-
ried out the International Northern Sea Route Program (INSROP) 1993–1999, 
gathering and analyzing an extensive information base on the conditions for ship-
ping.25 An experimental voyage from Yokohama to Kirkenes, Norway, was organized 
in 1996.26 
In Japan’s Arctic policy document, attention to business opportunities is couched 
in language highly sensitive to the sovereignty interests of Arctic coastal states. At 
the first mention of the term “resources,” there is a footnote reminding readers that 
not only the land areas but also a “large part of the Arctic Ocean consists of the ter-
ritorial waters of the coastal states, and these have sovereignty or sovereign rights to 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves.”27 On maritime transport, 
while noting that the freedom of navigation is to be respected in the Arctic Ocean, it 
points out that in ice-covered waters LOSC Article 234 accords coastal states a spe-
cial status as regards means for protecting and preserving the marine environment.28 
Sixteen of the nineteen specific initiatives laid out in Japan’s policy document refer 
to international cooperation involving Arctic partners—the few exceptions concern 
building Japanese capacities that can contribute to global public goods like Arctic 
science and infrastructures for safer Arctic maritime operations. 
The Korean policy document also balances attention to northern sea routes with 
sensitivity to the interests of the Arctic Five, aiming “to contribute to sustainable 
future of the Arctic by enhancing cooperation with the Arctic coastal states and rel-
evant international organizations.”29 Korea has a shorter Arctic history than Japan, 
first acceding to the Spitsbergen Treaty in 2012. However, the Korean Polar Research 
Institute had already established a research station in Ny-Ålesund in 2002 and has 
conducted polar research cruises with its own icebreaking vessel since 2009.30 The 
list of implementing actions is structured under similar headings as in Japan’s strat-
egy, but business opportunities, rather than international cooperation or scientific 
research, feature notably in the Korean document. Among the business opportuni-
ties, maritime transport and shipbuilding/logistical services loom much larger than 
involvement in resource development activities. Contributing to development of the 
Northern Sea Route and Arctic cooperation was among the national priorities defined 
in 2013 by then-President Park Geun-hye for achieving a “creative economy.”31 
Yet, both the Korean and the Japanese documents are moderate in their assess-
ments of the material benefits derivable from pursuing Arctic business opportunities. 
Although commercialization of Arctic routes features prominently among the busi-
ness opportunities that motivate the Korean policy document, explicit shorter-term 
objectives mention only feasibility assessments.32 Similarly, the Japanese document 
notes that “the Arctic Sea Route is not ready yet for safe and reliable use” and 
that the “private sector and the government should work together to give the future 
potential of this route serious consideration.”33 In contrast to the boldness of Chi-
na’s policy as regards shipping, Japan pledges only to “[i]dentify the natural, tech-
nical, systemic and economic challenges of the Arctic Sea Route, and preparation 
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of an environment for its utilization by Japanese shipping companies and others.”34 
Like Korea, Japan emphasizes that Arctic shipping offers options that might become 
important in the future but hardly in the short term. 
China, Japan and Korea have all formulated shipping and other maritime objec-
tives within fairly comprehensive sets of policies on Arctic affairs. China most clearly 
stresses the rights of non-Arctic states in the region. All three note the mutual ben-
efits derivable from cooperation with Arctic states in science and commerce, within 
and beyond national waters. Korea has the greatest emphasis on business opportu-
nities, highlighting shipbuilding and maritime transport—but its general assessment 
here is sober, as is Japan’s. 
We now examine the roles played by the maritime sectors of government in devel-
oping these Arctic policies, and the preparedness of maritime industries in the three 
countries to commit themselves financially to Arctic sea routes.
Bureaucratic involvement
The scope of governmental agencies involved in the formulation of Arctic policy 
statements has broadened in all three states examined here. The prominence of the 
ministry responsible for maritime shipping ranges from very high in Korea to very 
modest in China. 
In Japan, the ministry responsible for science and technology (MEXT) allocates 
the largest funding for Arctic activities and has traditionally been the key player on 
Arctic matters.35 This situation changed with the rising prominence of the Arctic in 
Japan’s Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, renewed every five years in a process coordinated 
by the Cabinet Office and its Headquarters for Ocean Policy.36 The Headquarters, 
whose task is to “promote measures with regard to the oceans comprehensively and 
systematically,” is directed by the Prime Minister and includes all other ministers 
with ocean competence.37 It was this body that formally adopted Japan’s Arctic pol-
icy in 2015. Among the participants active in formulating this policy was the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs—as evident in the Arctic Task Force it set up in 2010 to assess 
the scope of Japan’s interest in the region,38 its active diplomacy for obtaining Arctic 
Council observer status, and the subsequent appointment of an Ambassador for 
Arctic Affairs. The Ministry responsible for shipping (MLIT) also left a mark on the 
process, commissioning reports on economic as well as legal aspects of the Northern 
Sea Route, and successfully pressing for greater attention to Arctic shipping when 
the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was up for renewal in 2013.39 When the bid for Arctic 
Council observer status succeeded in 2013, an inter-ministerial Liaison Committee 
on Arctic Issues was established; in Japan, such committees are often created when 
turf struggles are seen as impeding necessary cross-agency coordination.40 In sum-
mary: the shipping segment of government has participated actively in the formu-
lation of Japan’s Arctic policy—but the coordinating role, and the greatest financial 
muscle for Arctic activities, are located elsewhere.
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In contrast, Korea’s process of developing an Arctic policy has been driven by the 
Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF), a bureaucratic heavyweight responsible 
not only for shipping, maritime infrastructure, and marine living resources, but also 
for polar research.41 Six other ministries contributed to the policy document; the pro-
cess was reportedly harmonious, not least because the list of implementing actions 
is essentially a compilation of ongoing or already financed Arctic activities.42 The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs participated in this process; it represents Korea in Arctic 
Council meetings—since 2015 by a designated Arctic ambassador—but its role in 
the formulation of a national Arctic policy has been less prominent than in Japan. In 
Korea, the MOF holds not only the formal coordinating role in policy development, 
but also the issue-area expertise that derives from budgetary responsibility for Arctic 
research logistics. This allocation of administrative responsibilities is in line with our 
observation that maritime business opportunities figure more saliently in the Korean 
document than in that of Japan. 
China’s slow pace in publishing an Arctic policy document is in line with its 
generic foreign-policy approach, originally advanced by Deng Xiaoping, of seeking 
to avoid unnecessary alarm about the country’s gradually increasing financial and 
geopolitical weight.43 It also reflects the high degree of fragmentation typical of Chi-
nese foreign policy, with the Party, the government, and the military offering largely 
separate paths for influencing the many issues that never reach the main coordinat-
ing mechanism, the Leading Small Group for Foreign Affairs.44 
In the development of China’s Arctic policy, no single bureaucratic entity has 
had an aggregating role comparable to that of the Cabinet Office in the Japanese 
process or MOF in Korea—and the ministry responsible for shipping has not been 
much involved. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates China’s participation 
in the Arctic Council as well as its “track-2” level of Arctic diplomacy—attendance 
at salient international Arctic conferences arranged by non-governmental organiza-
tions. Two salient track-2 annual events are the Arctic Frontiers in Tromsø (Norway) 
and the Arctic Circle in Reykjavik (Iceland); China has used both venues for artic-
ulating its views on Arctic affairs.45 Since 2017, the ministry has had a special rep-
resentative for Arctic affairs, but the governmental agency with the broadest scope 
of Arctic-relevant expertise, widely portrayed as the pivotal player in China’s Arctic 
activities, was the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) under the Ministry of Land 
and Resources.46 The SOA was responsible for marine research, marine environ-
mental protection, as well as some maritime industries other than shipping proper. 
It was also the lead agency for the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration, 
orchestrator of polar expeditions, and headed the Chinese Advisory Committee for 
Polar Research (CACPR). In 2018, the ministerial structure was changed: the SOA 
was dismantled, and most of its functions were transferred to the new Ministry of 
Natural Resources.47 The Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration became an 
agency under this Ministry.
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Because the CACPR serves as a linchpin between polar research organizations and 
relevant governmental or military bureaucracies, institutional membership offers a 
low-threshold indicator of Arctic interest among Chinese agencies. Interestingly, 
China’s Ministry of Transport, responsible for the world’s biggest shipping industry, 
which is often portrayed as eyeing northern sea routes with special interest, is not 
among the CACPR members—unlike a large number of other ministries or agencies 
under the State Council, as well as the People’s Liberation Army Headquarters of 
the Central Staff.48 
To summarize, the Arctic portfolios of the three states examined here have tradi-
tionally belonged to the ministry overseeing polar research, but the scope of bureau-
cratic involvement has broadened significantly in recent years. In Korea, the Ministry 
of Oceans and Fisheries is responsible for polar research logistics as well as shipping 
and other maritime industries, and is the undisputed nucleus of the country’s Arc-
tic policy development. In Japan, the shipping sector of government has played a 
more modest role in policy development, coordinated by the Cabinet Office; this 
also applies to China’s relatively fragmented process, which has not yet engaged the 
Ministry of Transport to any significant extent. 
We now assess how Asian shipping industries perceive Arctic opportunities, draw-
ing partly on official statements and private survey responses by companies and 
industry associations, but mostly on what these players have actually done in terms 
of investments or other tangible commitments to Arctic projects. 
Economic commitment
Rather than focusing on Arctic opportunities, an analysis of the material interests 
that Asian states may have in Arctic sea routes must start with the maritime policies 
and the shipping-sector characteristics of each state. Only this point of departure can 
provide a realistic picture of the extent of interest in Arctic shipping and help clarify 
whether other factors, like geopolitical considerations, affect Asian involvement in 
Arctic shipping.
When the Northern Sea Route (NSR) was opened to foreign vessels in 1991, 
the international shipping community showed little interest—partly due to unat-
tractive commercial and administrative conditions but also to the perception that 
ice remained a major obstacle, posing severe risks likely to generate prohibitive 
insurance costs.49 Twenty years later, the combination of climate change, receding 
ice-cover, and rising prices on Arctic natural resources had drastically boosted 
global interest in the NSR.50 Russian authorities had begun promoting it actively, 
and several practical steps had improved conditions for international usage.51 
The first transit sailing through the entire route without entering a Russian port 
occurred in 2010. Steadily rising numbers of international sailings took place in 
subsequent years, some using the entire North-East passage but most bringing 
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raw materials from Russian ports to Europe or Asia. A host of scholarly articles 
appeared, most of them concluding that the NSR could become a regular trans-
port route in the near future.52 
These developments caught the attention of major shipping actors in the three 
countries examined here—but their points of departure differed widely. China and 
Korea had little prior experience with Arctic shipping issues, whereas Japanese busi-
ness and government circles had a long track record of evaluating prospects for the 
use of northern sea routes. These differences have affected their approaches to Arctic 
shipping—we note Japan’s cautious concentration on transport needs deriving from 
ongoing Arctic resource extraction, Korea’s focus on shipbuilding services, and 
China’s initially ambitious and comprehensive approach to business opportunities 
in the maritime Arctic.
Japan and destination shipping
Among the Asian countries, Japan has the greatest potential to gain from use of 
NSR in terms of reduced sailing distance between the Atlantic and Pacific, due to its 
northerly location. This interest manifested in Japanese involvement in the Interna-
tional Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP), conducted in the 1990s to clar-
ify the conditions and outlook for international use of the NSR.53 INSROP ended in 
1999, with largely negative conclusions on the short-term commercial prospects.54 
When attention to the NSR resurged around 2010, these conclusions were still 
well remembered in Japan. Its shipping sector in particular was reluctant to explore 
new possibilities in the Arctic. However, some research organizations pushed for 
more attention on the region—notably the well-connected Ocean Policy Research 
Foundation, which had been the Japanese coordinator in INSROP and for the 
Japanese follow-up project, JANSROP.55 From 2010, this organization convened 
annual conferences aimed at establishing a unified view on Arctic developments 
among stakeholders; in 2012 an outline for an Arctic strategy was presented to the 
government, urging a more active Japanese role in the Arctic.56 These efforts were 
reflected in Japan’s Arctic strategy launched in October 2015, but, as noted, the 
formulations concerning shipping were cautious.
A survey of Japanese shipping companies confirmed this picture: any interest in 
Arctic shipping is highly modest at most.57 The arguments for caution mentioned 
by the industry representatives surveyed echo the findings of the INSROP project: 
higher construction and operational costs, unpredictable ice-situation for some of 
the year, and limitations on vessel size due to shallow straits, impeding economies 
of scale. Such factors carry differing weight for different shipping segments, but the 
overall industry perception reported is that the additional costs outweigh the bene-
fits deriving from shorter sailing distance and associated fuel savings. There is some 
interest in destination shipping, transporting cargo to or from Arctic ports, but very 
little interest in the trans-Arctic option.58 
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Future Japanese involvement in Arctic shipping is closely linked to ongoing raw 
material projects in the Russian north, particularly oil and natural gas. Japanese 
shipbuilders made bids to build carriers for the huge Yamal LNG project in West 
Siberia but lost out to Korean competitors (see below). However, a Japanese ship-
ping company within the Mitsui group partnered with China Shipping in a joint 
venture established to own and operate a subset of the carriers under construction 
for this project.59 Another Japanese company, NYK Line, reportedly sought coop-
eration with Russia’s Sovcomflot on the management of five carriers, but the deal 
fell through when Sovcomflot reneged on four of the five carriers it had originally 
intended to order. 
Prefectural authorities in the northern province of Hokkaido have demonstrated 
interest in the NSR, since the northern location of its ports, notably Tomakomai, 
could make them attractive as transshipment hubs.60 Studies have shown the feasi-
bility of container shipping as well as vehicle transportation on the NSR, in combi-
nation with the Suez route when ice conditions prevent Arctic transit.61 Others have 
noted the inconvenience and extra cost of operating two logistical chains and have 
questioned the distance benefit of Arctic shipping, now that Asian industrial produc-
tion has tended to migrate further south in Asia.62
All things considered, Japan remains a potential player in the development of Arc-
tic shipping, but it is not in the forefront commercially—and commercial shipping 
interests have not been a strong driver for its Arctic policy.
Korea and shipbuilding
Shipping and shipbuilding rank high on the Arctic agenda of Korea, which became 
an important shipbuilding nation relatively late. The first major yard was established 
in 1968 as part of a deliberate and focused government policy that quickly yielded 
results. By the early 2000s, Korea was the world’s leading shipbuilder, but fierce com-
petition loomed, particularly from China. Seeking to sustain the global position of its 
shipbuilding, the Korean government cooperated closely with the chaebols, the large 
industry conglomerates that control the yards, encouraging a focus on advanced, 
high-value ships like LNG carriers.63 When Arctic shipping began attracting global 
attention, it was only logical for major Korean companies to explore opportunities 
in a market expected to grow. In July 2013, the Korean yard DSME won the tender 
for building 15 ice-breaking LNG carriers for the Yamal LNG project in the Russian 
Arctic, the first of its kind.64
The Korean government is eager to develop and broaden this engagement: it has 
made development of Arctic shipping a national priority and encouraged shipping 
companies to engage in Arctic operations.65 In 2013, Hyundai Glovis, a shipping 
company closely connected to Hyundai Motors and with transportation of cars and 
trucks as its main line of business, announced that it would test the NSR for oil 
transport, conducting a trial voyage with 37,000 tons of naphtha from the Baltic Sea 
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to Korea.66 However, plans for developing a regular cargo route were abandoned; in 
interviews conducted by Korean researchers, company representatives cited several 
problems. Chief among them were the extra costs deriving from the need to reload 
containers, relatively small cargo volumes, and difficulties in matching cargo and 
ships.67 Other negative factors were unpredictable escort fees and icebreaker avail-
ability as well as costs associated with protection of cargo on board, crew training 
and ship maintenance due to extreme environmental conditions. 
Two other major shipping companies—the container liners Hanjin Shipping and 
Hyundai Merchant Marine—announced in 2013 that they would conduct trial nav-
igation on the NSR in line with the priorities declared by the government. However, 
these plans were also cancelled, mainly due to developments within the Korean ship-
ping industry.68 Several major Korean shipping companies were financially over-
stretched, and some were on the verge of bankruptcy in 2015–16. In a situation 
where companies had to restructure and cut costs, exploring long-term possibilities 
in the Arctic through costly trial voyages could not be prioritized.69 However, in 
2017 Hyundai Merchant Marine came back with a new plan for a regular route with 
relatively small container ships starting trial runs in 2020.70 Korean shipping com-
panies have also been involved in deliveries of equipment to oil and gas projects on 
the Yamal Peninsula.
In addition to shipbuilding and shipping, Korea has aspired to become a hub 
for the distribution of oil and other commodities transported through or from the 
Arctic;71 the authorities have singled out Busan port as well as Ulsan further north as 
particularly well placed logistical hubs, should the NSR become commercialized.72 
But a low oil price has postponed several Arctic projects, perhaps indefinitely; and 
although some Arctic oil projects are likely to be implemented, volumes will be much 
smaller than previously expected.73
To sum up, although a Korean yard won the largest Arctic shipbuilding tender to 
date (for Yamal LNG), the Arctic ‘market’ as a whole has not developed as rapidly 
as foreseen, exposing broader Korean vulnerabilities. The country is expected to 
undergo a phase of economic restructuring—shipbuilding and shipping will remain 
important, but the Arctic can form only a small part of the solution to the problems 
at hand.
China and rising caution
Shipping opportunities in the Arctic have also attracted industrial attention in China. 
In 2010, Jakobson identified an internal Chinese debate beginning around 2008 on 
China’s role in the Arctic, with an emphasis on maritime issues and especially the 
attraction of a shorter sailing route to Europe and the US East Coast.74 Subsequently, 
several articles were published in English-language journals, detailing the attractions 
of a shorter sailing route to the Atlantic and giving the outside world an impression 
of strong Chinese commitment to exploring the Arctic routes. Zhang and associates 
argued that, under certain conditions, container traffic on the Northern Sea Route 
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could reach up to 1180 million TEUs by 2030, corresponding to 50% of expected 
volumes between the North Pacific and Northwestern Europe.75 Such huge figures 
took on a life of their own and were soon interpreted as official predictions rather 
than the theoretical exercise they in fact were.76 The impression of a comprehensive 
Chinese maritime strategy towards the Arctic was reinforced by the cruise in August/
September 2012 by the Chinese icebreaker research vessel Xuelong (Snow Dragon) 
belonging to the Polar Research Institute of China, for the first time traversing the 
Arctic Ocean, including the NSR.77 Chinese interest in commercial exploitation 
of Arctic shipping was also reflected in the effort to send a ship through the NSR 
on an experimental voyage in 2013. The journey with the combined bulk carrier/ 
container ship Yong Shen in August/September 2013 drew headlines worldwide. 
China Daily quoted industry experts as saying: “Cosco Shipping Co’s new shortcut 
route to Europe and North America via the Arctic Northeast Passage is expected to 
change China’s industrial layout in its coastal provinces and reshape the prospects for 
the global shipping sector.”78
But how strong was the commitment by the Chinese shipping sector? In sharp 
contrast to the optimistic projections by Chinese scholars, interviews and surveys 
among Chinese shipping companies conducted in 2013 indicated a striking dis-in-
terest in Arctic routes among Chinese shipping companies.79 COSCO was the sole 
company to announce specific plans for exploring the NSR, with the Yong Shen sail-
ing as the only one scheduled. However, in 2015, COSCO—which presents itself as 
the world’s largest maritime operator and provider of logistics services—announced 
that it would start a regular container shipping service through the Arctic;80 and 
in early 2016 it agreed with the ABS classification society on trans-arctic shipping 
development, aiming to “expand Cosco’s use of the Northeast Passage for more 
regular trading, explore navigation in Northwest Passage, and develop ice-classed 
vessels.”81
Such statements can be interpreted as expressions of keen interest in Arctic ship-
ping from a major player. However, actual shipping activity has remained modest. 
In 2014, not a single ship under Chinese flag transited the whole NSR, in 2015 
only one (Yong Shen again), and in 2016 two.82 In 2017 there were three sailings 
westwards and two eastwards.83 A similar pattern emerges for destination shipping, 
showing very low levels of traffic between the NSR and Chinese ports in 2012 and 
2013 (respectively, five and four sailings into China; six and two out of China). 
In 2014 there was no traffic; 2015 and 2016 saw two and five destination sailings 
respectively.84 The actual numbers were higher in 2017, perhaps as many as 12,85 but 
the accuracy of all figures for reported sailings can be questioned because of unclear 
definitions and poor reporting procedures. It is clear, however, that most of the des-
tination sailings went to Sabetta, with materials and equipment for the port and the 
Yamal LNG plant. These transports were conducted mainly by COSCO’s division 
for ultra-heavy and super-large transport. As that development project was com-
pleted in 2017, this particular customer will vanish, but extension of the Sabetta port 
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and new hydrocarbon development projects in the same region will spur demand for 
similar shipping services.
Shipment of LNG from Yamal will in itself give a boost to Arctic destination ship-
ping, and Chinese shipping interests will be heavily involved. There are Chinese 
owner interests in 14 of the 15 icebreaking LNG carriers under construction in 
South Korea. Chinese companies are partnering in three joint ventures with ship-
ping companies from Japan, Greece and Canada—but all will be operated by the 
non-Chinese partners. That arrangement underscores China’s lack of experience in 
Arctic shipping operations, but also the financial strength of Chinese companies and 
their determination to take part in projects that can be termed “strategic.” 
All the same, Chinese shipping activity in the Arctic falls short of the expecta-
tions created a few years ago. There has been no boom in Chinese Arctic shipping— 
certainly not in the international-transit segment that formed the basis for those 
expectations. China’s very modest use of the NSR for transit must be seen in con-
nection with the generally weak development of international transit traffic there, 
the annual number of full NSR transits between the Pacific and the Atlantic never 
exceeding 15.86 In addition, problems in the Chinese shipping industry, unrelated to 
the Arctic but similar to those facing Korean shipping, have played a role. Soon after 
the trial journey in 2013, it became clear that COSCO was in deep financial trouble 
due to over-contracting of ships;87 in late 2015, it was announced that the company 
would merge with China Shipping Group, another state-owned shipping holding.88 
The merger entailed a major reorganization of the state-owned Chinese shipping 
industry, spurred by overcapacity in the global shipping market. Moreover, the ulti-
mate potential of the NSR for China may be questioned. As noted by Humpert, 
“trade with Northern Europe, the region most relevant to Arctic shipping, accounts 
for just 2.9 percent of China’s international trade.”89
Since 2013, announcements of upcoming container routes have tended to be brief 
and unspecific on implementation schedule, scope and service frequency, indicating 
that COSCO prefers to keep longer-term options open. But in 2018, the company 
announced that three new 36,000 DWT ice-class multi-purpose carriers would be 
ready in the course of the year.90 Intended as the company’s main operating ships in 
the Arctic, they will be used to establish a route with three to four westbound and 
four to six eastbound voyages annually.91 COSCO realizes that the ships will not be 
filled up with cargo initially;92 the company is prepared to conduct a loss-making 
operation for some time—not unusual in connection with Chinese infrastructure 
investments. This is clearly an important step, but a relatively cautious one.93 
How much of this development is commercially driven, and how much is dic-
tated by political priorities? A company like COSCO must take political signals into 
account. According to the head of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Admin-
istration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), which is the chief regulator of 
Chinese state-owned assets, “state firms should become ‘the most trustworthy’ enti-
ties upon which the party and the country rely and an important force for China’s 
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ambitious trade and infrastructure strategy, known as the Belt and Road initiative.”94 
This implies that state companies will invest some of their resources to help realize 
the government’s ambitions.
The framework for China’s international transport initiatives is the far-flung BRI 
(Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road) initiative first presented in 2013. 
The initiative—or plan—is a broad policy for integrating China with world markets, 
including the establishment of new transport routes. At the core is a vision of new 
railway, road and pipeline connections via central Asia and Russia to Europe, with 
new shipping and logistics chains in Asia.95 In the 2015 Action Plan released jointly 
by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce, the list of potential infrastructure and logis-
tics developments was very long—but the Arctic was not mentioned.96 True, the Silk 
Road Fund, established in 2014, has invested in the Yamal LNG project in Russia’s 
Arctic, indicating, according to Bennett, that the initiative is also about access to 
resources.97 In the 13th Five-Year Plan for Marine Development (2016–2020), 
however, Arctic shipping was not mentioned at all.98
Things changed when a new “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt 
and Road Initiative” was released on June 20, 2017. It stated that “Another blue 
economic passage is also envisioned leading up to Europe via the Arctic Ocean.”99 
There has been some discussion about the origin of this initiative, with Chinese 
sources indicating that it was initially a Russian idea.100 Considerable frustration 
existed in Russia that the BRI seemed to entail the establishment of new trans-
port routes largely bypassing Russia, at a time when Russia had ambitious ideas for 
developing its NSR. In the autumn of 2015 deputy premier Dmitriy Rogozin, who 
had a coordinating role in Russia’s Arctic policy, proposed the creation of a “Cold 
Silk Road,” explicitly linking the NSR to the Belt and Road Initiative.101 However, 
China seemed reluctant to extend the BRI to the Arctic; the idea was mentioned 
only briefly and cautiously by Putin in a long speech to the major conference “One 
Belt, One Road” in Beijing, May 14, 2017.102 With the vision document published 
just a month later, China declared interest—however, without specific commitment 
to develop the route: “China supports efforts by countries bordering the Arctic in 
improving marine transportation conditions, and encourages Chinese enterprises 
to take part in the commercial use of the Arctic route.”103 This formulation places 
the Arctic route in a different category than other maritime Silk Road stretches 
where specific investments and diplomatic efforts are underway. When Xi Jinping 
met Prime Minister Medvedev in November 2017, support for a Polar Silk Road was 
couched in very general terms in the official statement.104
China’s long-awaited 2018 Arctic policy document again encouraged Chinese 
enterprises “to participate in the infrastructure construction for these routes and 
conduct commercial trial voyages in accordance with the law to pave the way for 
their commercial and regularized operation.”105 But the document strongly stressed 
international cooperation in developing Arctic shipping routes and did not mention 
Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping: Policies, Interests and Footprints on Governance
39
Russia specifically. It seems that Chinese authorities do not want their vision of a 
Polar Silk Road—or a “Silk Road on Ice”—to be seen as an appendix to Russian 
plans, although they realize that Russia must play a key role in any development of 
trans-Arctic shipping for the foreseeable future.
Even if the development of Arctic shipping corresponds with China’s broad policy 
goals, we find no evidence that Arctic options enjoy high priority. Chinese ship-
ping companies are encouraged—but not strongly—to take part in Arctic shipping. 
To Chinese policymakers, it would appear commercially advantageous for Chinese 
companies to be involved in the opening of a new international transport route, 
and cooperation in developing NSR infrastructure would sit well with the numer-
ous proposals under the Russian–Chinese partnership agreement on more Chinese 
foreign direct investment in Russia.106 A financial mechanism was created in 2018 
with a USD 9.5 billion credit line from China, aimed at “joint integration processes 
on the area of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Chinese Belt and Road ini-
tiative,” with the NSR mentioned as a priority.107 However, even if commitments to 
this Arctic seaway would be positive for bilateral relations with Russia, the Chinese 
authorities are unlikely to undertake large-scale investments without serious consid-
eration of the long-term commercial potential. For Chinese commercial shipping 
companies, the time horizon in evaluating profitability is a short one. There are also 
political obstacles in the bilateral relationship that may slow down developments. 
Chinese representatives have occasionally alluded to the need for some sort of joint 
management of the NSR, if China is to invest heavily in infrastructure.108 This has 
remained totally unacceptable to Russia. 
As with Japan and Korea, China’s interest in Arctic shipping is real but increas-
ingly cautious, and expectations are considerably lower today than in 2012/2013. 
Whereas Korea has emphasized the market for ice-strengthened vessels, explora-
tion by Chinese companies has revolved around transport, with COSCO as the 
most active player by far. Despite optimistic projections, transits through the entire 
North-East passage have remained rare; the only large-scale financial commitments 
by Asian vessel operators to Arctic shipping opportunities are those by the Chinese 
and, to a lesser extent, Japanese owners of custom-made gas carriers serving the 
major resource development project in the Russian North, the Yamal LNG. 
Diplomatic engagement
As with policy documents, bureaucratic involvement, economic commitment and 
diplomatic engagement in the regulation of Arctic shipping offer important indi-
cators of Asian-state interest. International law generally reflects the preference of 
leading shipping states for globally uniform standards, constraining the regulatory 
leeway for coastal states to act alone or regionally. That is why a UN specialized 
agency, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), forms the centerpiece 
of the institutional complex that governs Arctic shipping, a complex that includes 
Arild Moe & Olav Schram Stokke
40
states, private classification societies, regional bodies like the Arctic Council, and a 
string of port-state control arrangements.109 Asian states have kept low profiles in 
these multilateral arenas for Arctic governance thus far. Nor have they used bilateral 
channels to challenge existing unilateral shipping regulations, to which we now turn. 
Positions on coastal-state unilateralism
Among the regional states, Canada and Russia have by far the longest Arctic coast-
lines, and both are assertive on Arctic jurisdictional matters. The LOSC generally 
confirms the regulatory near-monopoly that flag states have traditionally had when-
ever passage occurs outside the internal waters of another state, reflected in the right 
to innocent passage through the territorial sea where the coastal state has sover-
eignty. Within its EEZ, a coastal state cannot legally impose standards higher than 
those “conforming to and giving effect to generally accepted international rules and 
standards established through the competent international organization,” meaning 
the IMO.110 Yet, as Japan noted in its Arctic policy document, the LOSC tempers 
this general restrictiveness by granting coastal states “the right to adopt and enforce 
non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of 
marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive 
economic zone,” provided those rules “have due regard to navigation.”111 Ambiguity 
remains concerning the precise meaning of “due regard” and whether these regula-
tory rights also apply landward of the EEZ, in the territorial sea – which might affect 
the right of foreign vessels to unimpeded transit passage in the Arctic.112 While Arti-
cle 234 expands the coastal-state regulatory competence, the precise extent of that 
competence is contestable, and contested—but not by the Asian states studied here. 
Both Canada and Russia have unilaterally adopted laws on reporting, discharge, 
as well as the design, construction, equipment and manning of vessels operating 
in Arctic waters adjacent to their coasts—laws stricter than those agreed in IMO 
instruments.113 Unlike most IMO treaties, these regulations also apply to foreign 
government ships on non-commercial service. Neither state relies solely on Article 
234 for these standards: Canada’s original Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
(AWPPA) legislation preceded the LOSC negotiations and was a major motivation 
for the Canadian initiative to include an Article on ice-covered waters. Both states 
argue that parts of the shipping lanes in question are internal waters and thus subject 
to the same regulatory sovereignty as that applicable on land.114 Nevertheless, both 
Canada and Russia have adapted their legislation to Article 234. In 2009, Canada 
expanded the spatial scope of AWPPA from 100 to 200 nm, in line with the spatial 
scope of Article 234; and in 2012, Russia included an explicit reference to the EEZ 
when amending its 1991 NSR legislation, interpreted by observers as a means to 
invoke the legitimacy of the LOSC for bolstering its unilateral regulation.115 
Unlike the USA and the EU, none of the Asian states has explicitly contested 
Canada’s or Russia’s unilateral regulation of shipping northwards of their Arctic 
coasts.116 True, China notes in its Arctic policy that “disputes over the Arctic shipping 
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routes should be properly settled in accordance with international law”,117 which 
could be interpreted as a hint at multilateral dispute resolution. As yet, there have 
been no signs of such dispute. When China’s ice-breaking research vessel Xuelong 
traversed the Northwest Passage in August 2017, the vessel applied for permission in 
accordance with Canadian legislation;118 a practice pursued consistently with Russia 
when sailing in the NSR. Indeed, all Chinese, Korean and Japanese commercial or 
government ships that have transited the NSR in recent years have complied with 
Russian regulations: applying for a permit to enter the NSR, presenting relevant 
information about the ship’s capabilities and voyage plan, and agreeing to pay for ice 
pilotage and icebreaker services if such services are deemed necessary by Russian 
authorities.119 Asian shipping actors see the high pilotage and icebreaker fees as a 
major drawback when assessing the Arctic route towards the Suez alternative; infor-
mally, they have proposed that such fees be subject to bilateral or regional negoti-
ations.120 The misgivings of potential users of the NSR have apparently had some 
impact: whereas the Russian practice had been to charge such fees regardless of 
whether the services proved necessary, the NSR legislation in force from 2013 man-
dates payment only for services rendered, as part of broader efforts to make the NSR 
administration more palatable to foreign users and also more in line with LOSC 
Article 234.121 The main point here, however, is that unlike the USA, the leading 
Asian states have so far refrained from politically challenging the unilateral shipping 
regulations Russia and Canada have put in place in ice-covered waters adjacent to 
their coasts. 
The IMO Polar Code
By far the most prominent international negotiations on Arctic shipping of the past 
decade have concerned the IMO Polar Code, adopted in 2015 and setting forth 
mandatory regulations and standards for ships operating in ice-covered waters with 
respect to vessel design, construction, equipment, manning and training.122 Formal 
negotiations began in 2009; representatives of China, Japan and Korea all partici-
pated in the Correspondence Group that worked on draft texts between sessions, but 
they generally kept a low profile.123 
A review of the documents submitted to the IMO subcommittee tasked with the 
Polar Code negotiations, including reports of the Correspondence Group, provides 
no indication that any Asian state saw these negotiations as an opportunity to influ-
ence developments in an arena important for Arctic governance.124 Most of the doc-
umentation from these meetings was submitted by Arctic states or by European 
states with observer status in the Arctic Council, like Germany and France. Of the 
141 documents on the matter submitted to this subcommittee before the adoption 
of the Polar Code, none originated with an Asian state.125 This changed somewhat 
towards the end of the process, when the draft text had reached the committee level. 
China and Korea co-sponsored two papers prior to final adoption by the Council, 
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including a successful proposal for more stringent language on the scope of the 
Code’s double-hull and double-bottom requirement for new vessels.126 In contrast, 
Japan’s single submission to that committee took the shipper’s perspective, not the 
shipbuilder’s or an environmental one, joining a successful industry-backed pro-
posal for widening an exemption for small tankers from the same requirement.127 
Environmental groups like the WWF, industrial organizations like the Cruise Lines 
International Association, and even the South Pacific micro-state Vanuatu were all 
considerably more active in submitting papers to the Polar Code negotiations than 
any of the Asian shipping giants examined here.
There is one exception: China (but not Japan and Korea) joined the USA in a pro-
posal to delete a savings clause in a draft Preamble that would have upheld the prior-
ity of national regulations over the Polar Code by providing that, until the adoption 
of a harmonized system, “States may retain local navigation rules and regulations for 
certain routes and waterways under their jurisdiction.”128 This savings clause, pro-
posed by Russia and supported by Canada, was not included in the final Polar Code.
As with the absence of Asian-state challenges to regulatory unilateralism in the 
Arctic, the generally low profile held by these states during the global Polar Code 
negotiations indicates that the Asian footprint on Arctic shipping governance is 
modest at best. 
Arctic Council engagement 
At the regional level of Arctic shipping diplomacy, China and Korea have attended 
Arctic Council meetings as ad hoc observers since 2008, and Japan since 2009. How-
ever, their involvement in the activities overseen by this high-level forum has been 
quite limited, also as regards shipping issues. 
One indicator of a state’s engagement in an international institution is the size of 
its delegations to important meetings. The numbers of officials or experts dispatched 
to Arctic Council events by the Asian states examined here are comparable to those 
for European observer states like Germany or the UK, and considerably lower than 
those for Arctic states.129 Twice a year, Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) meetings are 
held, overseeing the core activities conducted under six working groups as well as 
various ad hoc expert groups and task forces, all reporting to the Council’s high-
est body, the biennial Ministerial Meeting.130 Attendance at a SAO meeting is the 
least demanding in terms of specialized expertise and substantive contribution. 
Asian-state attendance has been higher and more frequent at the SAO level than 
in working groups, but even here delegations rarely exceed two persons. Meeting 
attendance in the working group with prime responsibility for shipping issues, that 
of Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), has been regular but with 
a small delegation from Korea and only an occasional presence from China and 
Japan.131 Unsurprisingly, the visibility of these states in PAME documents has been 
low, although some Korean initiatives are reported in recent years. In the PAME 
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documents available in the Council archives, no more than a quarter even mention 
an Asian state—typically only once and in passing.132 
In 2009, the Arctic Council published a comprehensive Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment (AMSA); implementation of recommendations from that assessment 
has been a stable item at subsequent PAME meetings.133 However, only the last of 
four AMSA progress reports makes any reference to an Asian state. In the single 
exception to this silence, Korean inputs are mentioned a few times in connection 
with a workshop co-arranged with PAME’s Shipping Expert Group on potential 
future projects, one that looms large in Korea’s most recent observer activity report 
to the Arctic Council.134 
The relatively low profile kept by these Asian states in the foremost regional 
forum for Arctic issues is partly explained by certain limitations that Arctic states 
have placed on observer participation. The Arctic Council Observer Manual 
encourages observers to “make relevant contributions through their engagement 
primarily at the level of working groups,” but requires that projects be proposed 
through an Arctic state or a Permanent Participant; and joint funding from observ-
ers to a project may not exceed that of Arctic states unless the SAO decides oth-
erwise.135 Especially during Canada’s 2013–2015 chairmanship, many observers 
considered the Arctic-state encouragement of active observer participation to be 
rather lukewarm. In its 2016 observer activity report, for instance, China noted 
that of the 25 experts it had nominated as participants in relevant programs, only 
eight were invited to join.136 
For several reasons, therefore, Asian states have been modest in making use of 
opportunities to participate in Arctic Council meetings and projects on Arctic mar-
itime transport. This approach at the regional level of shipping diplomacy is in line 
with the low profile they have maintained in bilateral interaction with Arctic coastal 
states and during global IMO negotiations of the Polar Code.
Conclusions
Shipping and shipbuilding are not quite as powerful drivers of the Arctic aspira-
tions pursued by China, Japan and the Republic of Korea as many believe. Arctic 
maritime transport is viewed with rising caution at governmental as well as industry 
levels in these countries. Soberness in evaluating maritime business opportunities is 
evident, particularly in Japanese and Korean policy documents and industry state-
ments. China’s Arctic policy is more upbeat on Arctic shipping options, subsuming 
them under the larger Belt and Road Initiative as a “Polar Silk Road.” However, the 
Chinese shipping industry’s actual moves into the region have been cautious, and 
increasingly so over time.
The bottom–up approach we have taken here means that any distinct advantages 
that Arctic sea routes enjoy over the Suez and Panama alternatives—notably, shorter 
distances and associated savings of fuel and time—are seen in light of the specific 
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political, bureaucratic, and economic conditions that surround shipping and ship-
building in China, Japan and Korea. 
The political attention those countries pay to the Arctic is clearly rising, but not 
as steeply as the rise in attention to Asia among Arctic-policy analysts. Claims to 
saliency as Arctic stakeholders are based primarily on the effects of Arctic climatic 
developments on their home territories and on the rights all non-coastal states enjoy 
under international law. However, China, Japan and Korea also emphasize their own 
contributions to scientific investigations in the Arctic as well as the relevance of 
their capital and technology for regional economic development. Especially in Chi-
na’s policy document, those reasons are reinforced by explicit references to its own 
prominence in global governance and international affairs. All three underscore that 
they fully respect the sovereign rights of coastal states, and none of them has explic-
itly challenged the controversial unilateral shipping regulations that Canada and 
Russia have established for ice-covered waters adjacent to their coasts. At regional 
and global levels too, the Asian states have maintained relatively low profiles, in ship-
ping-oriented activities under the Arctic Council and in the negotiations of a legally 
binding Polar Code under the International Maritime Organization.
The significance of shipping and shipbuilding for Asian engagement in the Arctic 
has also been conditioned by bureaucratic structures in each country and their prox-
imity to industry associations and fluctuations in the relevant markets. The minis-
tries of foreign affairs, and in Japan the Cabinet Office, have played important roles 
in the aggregation of comprehensive Arctic policies; in Korea the main driver has 
been the powerful Ministry for Oceans and Fisheries, which also has responsibility 
for shipping and polar research. Deep involvement of the segment of government 
closest to shipping and shipbuilding, characteristic of policy development in Korea 
and Japan, implies that elaboration of goals, priorities, and specific projects build on 
sector expertise sensitive not only to opportunities but also to political or economic 
constraints. In China as well as Korea, the two countries whose Arctic policies con-
vey the clearest emphasis on economic use, the shipping industries have been finan-
cially overstretched in recent years and thus less prepared to commit themselves to 
heavy investments where the expected returns are potentially high, but uncertain 
and still far in the future. 
For all three countries, rising attention to Arctic developments as well as broader 
aspirations of playing visible roles in global governance mean that maritime trans-
port projects involving this region are assessed with considerable interest, but we 
find nothing to indicate that they will be pursued unless the expected returns equal 
or exceed those of other options. “Arcticness” matters—but competitiveness decides. 
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